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capacity and a tigrine ruthlessness; and that to him, more than to any other individual, was due the postponement of the annexation of Sicily to Piedmont and the kindling of feuds which crackle still in his biographer's pages. Many historians now concede that Garibaldi's refusal to annex Sicily in June or July was wise, but only blind partizans attempt to defend the further delay.

Signor Palamenghi's method of proving Crispi's transcendent genius is to vilify Cavour, and not merely to vilify, but to make him out incompetent, petty, and often idiotic. Such a method of course defeats its object and exposes the animus of its author. You may hold what views you will of their policy and character, but if you attempt to dismiss the Bismarcks and Cavour's of history as puerile, you cannot command respect. The fatal flaw in this biography is that it is written from the 1860 point of view. The charges and calumnies which then flew to and fro from among party spokesmen are not investigated. The immense volume of testimony which has been printed since is not treated critically. The best motive that Signor Palamenghi can allege for Cavour's policy of controlling the revolutionary movement is that he was jealous of Garibaldi's popularity and fearful of being turned out of office! So this book, except for its documents, has slight value as history, although it perpetuates for a later generation the venom which was too large an ingredient of the Garibaldian exploit. Readers of the Marios, of Mazzini, of Pianciani, of Bertani, and of Crispi himself in his earlier phase do not need to be told afresh what that venom was. After granting the amplest honors to Crispi and Bertani for the good they accomplished in 1860, we must still hold them responsible for the evil, which sprang directly from their implacable and fanatic natures. If an American writer should rake up Horace Greeley's diatribes against Lincoln in 1862, and should set them forth without the correction which subsequent events and evidence furnish, he would produce just such a portrait of Lincoln as Signor Palamenghi draws of Cavour. As for Francesco Crispi, the halo here assigned him renders him almost unrecognizable. Like Stanton, he did much important work; but he did it fiercely, remorselessly, and often in a spirit in which personal love of power rather than patriotism seemed to guide him. Halos do not fit such men.

WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER.

Bayern im Jahre 1866 und die Berufung des Fürsten Hohenlohe.

Eine Studie von KARL ALEXANDER VON MÜLLER. (Munich and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg. 1909. Pp. xvi, 292.)

La Restauration de l'Empire Allemand: le Rôle de la Bavière. Par A. DE RUVILLE, Professeur à l'Université de Halle. Traduit de l'Allemand par M. PIERRE ALBIN. Avec une introduction sur les Papiers de Cerçay et le Secret des Correspondances Diplomatiques par M. JOSEPH REINACH. (Paris: Félix Alcan. 1911. Pp. xxxii, 327.)

VON MÜLLER's book, which was submitted as a doctor dissertation in the University of Munich in 1908, is a preliminary study for a future history of the ministry of Prince Hohenlohe in Bavaria (1867-1870). His method of treating the events of 1866 is conditioned by this ulterior purpose. His first chapter sketches the position of the German middle states in the last years of the old Confederation and the attitude of the South German parties towards the problem of German unity; outlines the "triad" policy of Minister von der Pfordten, *viz.* maintenance of the Confederation and a Bavarian hegemony in a middle-state group; indicates the *timeo Danaos* attitude of public opinion towards Bismarck's unexpected proposal of a new federation with a representative parliament; and describes more fully the reversal of sentiment which followed the victories of the Prussian armies, the reconciliation between Bismarck and the Prussian Liberals, and the steps taken to organize the North German Confederation. The second chapter is devoted to the personality and political views of Prince Hohenlohe. In spite of his Prussian sympathies, Hohenlohe had failed to understand Bismarck's plans, and as late as the end of March, 1866, he believed that Bavaria would be forced to go, for better or for worse, with Austria. To him, however, the Prussian demand for federal reform and a German parliament seemed serious. He sought and obtained on April 11 an audience with King Louis, and urged Bavarian support of the Prussian proposal. His arguments did not persuade the king; but the favorable personal impression that he produced, strengthened by the fact that events proved his foresight, explains his subsequent appointment to the Bavarian premiership. The third and fourth chapters narrate the occurrences of the autumn and early winter months; the conclusion of treaties of peace and also of secret treaties of alliance between Prussia and the South German states; the realignment of parties; the retirement of Pfordten; the formation of the Hohenlohe ministry and the formulation of its programme. The connection between the calling of Hohenlohe and the recalling of Richard Wagner is recognized but reduced to its true proportions.

The book is not of the grade of the usual doctor dissertation. Not only is the material collected and presented according to the best German traditions, with infinite pains and conscientious exactness, but its presentation is marked by a sureness of grasp, a ripeness of judgment, and a clarity and occasional felicity of expression not always found in the writings of older historians.

Some of the more solid of these qualities are lacking in Professor von Ruville's work. This author has avowedly adopted a method of writing history which he calls "the method of the broken coin". The archaeologist who finds an incomplete coin digs further for the complementary fragment, and if the edges match his problem is solved. The historian, confronted with a fact which he cannot explain, searches for an hypothesis. If he can find one which meets his intellectual needs and which is not contradicted by any known facts, his reconstruction is equally satis-

factory—to him. What we have here is, of course, a very old thing with a new name. The method of hypothetical reconstruction has always been used, more or less consciously and with varying degrees of caution, by the best historians. It is also used by writers of historical romances; and the more freely it is employed by a historian, the more nearly his work approaches fiction. The new name which von Ruville has invented he draws from, and perhaps thinks to justify by, a simile. Similes, of course, are not arguments, and his is not even a good simile. Neither the facts which are presented to the historian nor the hypotheses which he constructs have the sharp outlines which make conclusive demonstration of correspondence possible.

Von Ruville's first three chapters cover, more cursorily, the same ground which von Müller traverses. Here the only conspicuous use of the "broken coin" method is to be found in the author's assumption that the secret treaty of alliance between Prussia and Bavaria received a special moral sanction from an exchange of personal pledges between the two kings. For the existence of such a "royal pledge" on the part of Louis the author thinks he has direct evidence in the Bavarian and Prussian throne-speeches of January and February, 1870, ignoring the fact that in monarchic states all treaties are, in theory, personal engagements of the sovereigns and are constantly so described. He further insists that King Louis's loyal discharge of his treaty obligations is explicable only on the theory of a personal pledge of faith. In his fourth chapter he discusses, following Rothan (*L'Allemagne et l'Italie, 1870-71*), efforts alleged to have been made early in 1870 to secure for the King of Prussia the imperial title. Rothan's story, von Ruville says, "should not without further examination be regarded as the expression of the truth"; but after such examination he apparently decides that in its main lines at least it is true. How he reaches this result is not made clear to the old-fashioned student of history.

The second part of the volume (chapters 5-8) is devoted to the relations between Prussia and Bavaria in the summer and early autumn of 1870; the third part (chapters 9-12) to the negotiations, in the latter part of the year, of the treaties which made the South German states members of a new German empire. Here the hypothetical reconstruction of facts centres on the means employed by Bismarck to break the resistance of the South German premiers, especially that of Count Bray (Hohenlohe's successor), to the establishment of a strong imperial government. It is, of course, well known that none of the South German governments except that of Baden really desired such a solution of the German question, and it is ordinarily assumed that it was the logic of the situation and the sentiment of the German people that forced them to sacrifice their independence. Von Ruville has another explanation. In the chateau of Cercay, belonging to Rouher, the Germans found, in October, 1870, a mass of documents concerning the foreign relations of the Second Empire. A smaller collection of similar documents was seized at St. Cloud. All these were sent to the Prussian Foreign Office

at Versailles. In this mass of papers there was doubtless much South German correspondence; and probably there were letters from the very statesmen with whom Bismarck was negotiating, written at periods when the South German states, solicitous for their independence, were seeking the support of Napoleon III. In 1870, when North and South Germans were fighting shoulder to shoulder against the hereditary enemy, such letters would sound anti-national, morally treasonable. What could be more natural than that Bismarck should have utilized his control of this correspondence to extort from the South German statesmen submission to the Prussian demands? Von Ruville applies no derogatory epithet to such a procedure; but M. Reinach entitles his introduction to the translation: "An Historical Blackmail" ("Un 'Chantage' Historique"). In this instance it is evident that the author's hypothesis is more solidly based and more plausible than in the case of Louis's "royal word". A French historian of the first rank, whose methods are those usually practised by historians and who therefore probably had information not accessible to our author, had previously stated as a fact what the latter suggests as a supposition. Von Ruville himself quotes from Sorel (*Histoire Diplomatique de la Guerre Franco-Allemande*) the assertion that Bismarck made use of the Cerçay papers to threaten the courts of South Germany with revelations which would compromise them in public opinion, and that the very lively fears thus aroused singularly expedited the negotiations. Von Ruville, however, goes further than Sorel. He reconstructs the manner in which Bismarck must have used the documents, varying with the character and temperament of the persons to be influenced. Practically, we are present at the different interviews. All this is in the best manner of the historical romance.

The original German edition of this book appeared while von Müller's volume was printing; and the latter added an appendix of twenty pages: "Zur Kritik von A. v. Ruville." His detailed criticisms are limited to von Ruville's presentation of the events of 1866. He notes and discusses several points on which he and von Ruville differ, devoting most space to the hypothesis of King Louis's "royal word". In dealing with this and other products of the "broken coin" method, his procedure is simple and effective: he shows that the edges do not match by citing facts which are irreconcilable with von Ruville's theories. He shows, moreover, in one instance an almost incredible carelessness on the part of von Ruville in reading his sources. A statement of the latter regarding negotiations between the German governments in July, 1866, at Vienna and Nikolsburg is authenticated by a reference to "Pfordten's narration in the Chamber, October 12, 1866. State Archives, XI." Von Müller shows: (1) that the Bavarian Chamber was not in session in 1866 after August 31; (2) that there is no such narration by Pfordten in the volume cited; (3) that there is, in the volume cited, an extract from the *Bayerische Zeitung* of October 12, reporting remarks made in the Baden Chamber by the Baden minister of foreign affairs; (4) that

these remarks refer to negotiations in July, 1866, between the ministers of the South German states at Munich.

The French version of von Ruville's book reproduces without change all the statements which von Müller criticizes. It reproduces even the reference to Pfordten's lost speech, delivered in empty space.

MUNROE SMITH.

The Life of George Joachim Goschen, First Viscount Goschen, 1831-1907. In two volumes. By the Hon. ARTHUR D. ELLIOT. (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1911. Pp. xiii, 321; ix, 300.)

EVERY good contribution to English political biography has usually what may be described as one central value—a value over and above all else in the book that makes it of peculiar service to students of history. Some biographies throw much new light on political movements. Those of Peel and Cobden are typical of this class. Others illuminate a departure in colonial policy or the origin and conduct of a war; and others again add to what was known of ministerial crises of first importance. Goschen was sympathetically and helpfully associated with no great forward movement in English politics in the last half of the nineteenth century. Nominally he was a Whig, although not born into the Whig cult. On some questions—such as the ballot and the abolition of church rates and denominational tests at the universities—he was radical, and quite out of sympathy with the Tories. But on such questions as the extension of the franchise he was much more Tory than Whig. All his life he distrusted and dreaded democracy. He repudiated the contention of radical reformers that the poverty and social squalor of the mass of the people was in any way due to class legislation in the eighteenth century, or that the governing class was responsible for these conditions; and on questions of constitutional change he was almost invariably ready and eager to group himself with the standpatters, whether they were Whig or Tory.

He was of a family, German in origin and pushing in social ambitions, but not sufficiently long established in England to have any political traditions. Temperamentally, however, Goschen was a Tory on most political issues; and the wonder is how he was ever accepted as a Liberal candidate at Ripon and Edinburgh—constituencies that he represented between his service as one of the four members for the City of London (a service ending in 1868) and his election as Conservative for the Hanover Square division of Westminster in 1888. He was a stirring figure in the Home Rule crisis of 1886; he was the pivotal figure in the ministerial crisis at the end of 1887 brought about by Randolph Churchill's unexpected resignation of the chancellorship of the exchequer in the Salisbury administration. There is much new light on both these crises in the early years of the Home Rule struggle at Westminster—particularly in many hitherto unpublished letters from Hartington, and in